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THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE RULE OF AVOID-
ABLE CONSEQUENCES AS AFFECTED BY THE
DEGREE OF BLAMEWORTHINESS OF THE
DEFENDANT
RALPH S. BAUER*
A S iS well known, courts ordinarily say that they will not allow
a plaintiff to recover, either in contract or in tort, for damage
that would have been avoided if plaintiff had acted reasonably,
after the occurrence of defendant's wrong, to prevent such damage.
This is most plainly so where the breach of contract or the tort
has been such as to evince little or no real fault or blameworthiness
in the defendant, for a court is usually not desirous of inflicting
upon a righteous defendant an unnecessarily large and unjust
burden of damages; but, where the defendant has wilfully broken
a contract, or where he has wilfully or recklessly committed a
tort, courts have often seemed to regard the problem as sufficiently
different to justify a different kind of result, and have often
allowed the burden of the so-called duty to avoid consequences to
rest rather lightly upon the plaintiff where he is the victim of a
defendant whose conduct has been highly reprehensible. It seems
that the usual feeling of the court is that the wilful or reckless
defendant should not have too much protection by means of the
rule of avoidable consequences, just as courts frequently have
shown that they believe that such a defendant should not be
helped too much by a very strict application of the rules of legal
cause, certainty of proof, and excessive damages.'
1rProfessor of Law, De Paul University College of Law.
'Se Bauer, The Degree of foral Fault as Affecting Defendant's
Liability, (1933) 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 586, and Bauer, The Degree of Defend-
ant's Fault as Affecting the Administration of the Law of Excessive Com-
pensatory Damages, (1934) 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 583.
Strictly speaking, there is no duty in any plaintiff to do anything to
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In Loker v. Damon,2 one of the earlier and better known cases
on avoidable consequences, the defendant's wrong was the destruc-
tion and carrying away of ten rods of plaintiff's fence, very evi-
dently a wilful tort, and the court held that the plaintiff could not
recover for the loss of his grass by reason of his letting the field
remain open, for ten months, to the ravages of neighboring cattle.
Here was an instance in which a court, not feeling especially
desirous of helping the doer of a wilful wrong, might not readily
have applied the doctrine that a plaintiff is under a disability to
recover for damage in the nature of avoidable consequences, if
plaintiff had acted with mere negligence in his failure to avoid
damage that could easily have been averted. But one thing
probably more frequently overlooked than noticed, in referring
to that case, is the fact that the court seemed to view the plaintiff's
omission to close the gap as being rather a plain instance of a
wilful or reckless omission to act than as being conduct of the
grade of mere contributory negligence. Chief Justice Shaw said:
"Suppose a man should enter his neighbor's field unlawfully, and
leave the gate open; if, before the owner knows it, cattle enter and
destroy the crop, the trespasser is responsible. But if the owner
sees the gate open and passes it frequently, and wilfully and
obstinately or through gross negligence leaves it open all summer,
and cattle get in, it is his own folly." Exactly what the court
avoid consequences of defendant's wrongful act and thereby to mitigate the
damages that defendant will have to pay. Rock v. Van Dine, (1920) 106
Kan. 588, 189 Pac. 157, referring to Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions (1923) 65; (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 710. The term duty is used, how-
ever, by many judges in their opinions, in the loose way above indicated,
and it will be so used at points in this article, only because it makes for
brevity of expression.
One writer apparently has rejected absolutely the idea that degree of
blameworthiness has anything to do with the administering of the rule of
avoidable consequences, saying:
"The rule ... is really a rule of limitation upon the plaintiff's recovery.
Nor is it properly to be regarded as a species of mitigation of damages.
This relates to the defendant, and generally to the character of his acts;
e.g., that a tort was not malicious; that, after committing a trespass, he
repaired the wrong as far as possible. But a reduction of the plaintiff's
damages by any such particulars as flow from his own imprudent act, or
omission to act after the wrong has been committed, constitute a distinct
class of remote damages in the strict sense of the word; of damages which
flow from the- illegal act, but for which the law gives no redress." Sedgvick,
Damages (8th ed. 1891) 204, quoted with approval in Thieler v. Tillamook
County, (1916) 81 Or. 277, 158 Pac. 804.
Many cases on avoidable consequences appear in the following case-
books: Beale, Cases on Damages (3d ed. 1928) Ch. VI; McCormick, Cases
on Damages (1935) Ch. V; Crane, Cases on Damages (2d ed. 1940) Ch.
V; and Bauer, Cases on Damages (3d ed. 1940) Ch. V.
2(1835) 17 Pick. (Mass.) 284.
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would have said, if the plaintiff's only misconduct had been an
inadvertent omission to close the gap for a very short time, during
which damage by marauding cattle occurred, we do not know.
The case is no satisfactory authority on this point, although it
has often been cited as sustaining the rule that a plaintiff cannot
recover damages for consequences that would not have occurred
but for plaintiff's subsequent failure to do those things which a
reasonably prudent person would have done in order to avoid con-
sequences, or, in other words, would not have occurred but for
plaintiff's subsequent negligence in that he failed to prevent dam-
age that he could have prevented by acting as a reasonable man.
Loker v. Damon, cited supra, is a case of a wilful wrong of de-
fendant, plus subsequent contributory reckless misconduct on the
part of the plaintiff in his wilful failure to do anything to avoid
damage that was obviously imminent. The plaintiff's conduct
was flagrant, his attitude apparently being: "Let damage come.
However big it may be, I'll make this fellow pay for it." Of
course, the same court would have reached the same result if the
misconduct of the defendant had amounted only to negligence,
because this a fortiori must be so, for the reason that courts are
more ready to use the rule of avoidable consequence to protect a
merely negligent defendant than to protect a defendant who has
done a wilful wrong to the plaintiff.
Although there seems to be a tendency to apply the rule of
avoidable consequences much less frequently to cases of defend-
ant's wilful tort or wilful breach of contract than to other cases,
judicial opinions seldom say anything about any rule or principle
based on such a tendency. A few cases have accorded express
recognition, or a seeming tacit recognition, to a more or less vague
modification of the operation of the rule of avoidable conse-
quences on the apparent ground that defendant has acted wilfully
or recklessly. Very seldom has a court clearly and expressly
recognized that the rule of avoidable consequences affords any
less protection to the wilful or reckless defendant than to the
merely negligent defendant.
In Athens Mlanufacturing Co. v. Rucker,3 the court regarded
the flooding of plaintiff's land by defendant as intentional and not
as merely negligent, and, because of this, held that the rule of
avoidable consequences did not apply.
In Satterfield v. Rowan,4 the court held that the principle that
:(1887) 80 Ga. 291, 295, 4 S. E. 885.
4(1889) 83 Ga. 187. 190, 9 S. E. 677.
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the defendant may reduce the recovery for an injury by showing
that the plaintiff did not use ordinary care to diminish or avoid
the damage, does not apply where the act complained of is not a
mere act of negligence but is a "positive, continuous, tortious act,"
committed by the defendant in carrying dirt and ore from a mine
and washing it in a stream flowing through the land of both
parties, thereby producing continued adulteration of plaintiff's
water.
A wilful tort was before the court in Carmen v. Fox Film
Corporation,5 where defendant had wrongfully caused plaintiff's
employer to discharge her. Page, J., said:
"While there is a duty as between employer and employee,
for the employee to minimize the damage flowing from a breach
of the contract, there is no obligation on the part of a person
who has been deprived of the contract of employment by the inten-
tional wrong of a third person to minimize the damage to the
third person by entering upon other employment."
But the force of the decision in the Carmen Case, as one to the
effect that the rule of avoidable consequences does not apply to
intentional wrong, is weakened by the following words of the
court:
"The defendants claim that the plaintiff could only work for
them, and it was on that claim that they sought to justify their
interference with the employment of the plaintiff by the Keeney
corporation. It is to be presumed, if she had obtained employ-
ment of the same kind and character with some one else, that the
defendants would also have interfered with that employment."
From this latter statement, it appears that the court regarded
it as having been outside of the actual power of Miss Carmen to
avoid consequences by getting a similar position with another
company. Therefore the case is not very strong authority for the
proposition that, where the wrong is wilful, the plaintiff is not
under a disability to recover for avoidable damage. The court
has virtually said that the consequence of plaintiff's unemploy-
ment was, from the plaintiff's standpoint, unavoidable.
Directly to the point is the observation of the court in Rich-
5(1923) 204 App. Div. 776, 198 N. Y. S. 766. The following comment
has been made upon this case: "It is submitted that there is no basis for
the distinction between nonrecovery of avoidable consequences of a negligent
tort, a breach of contract, and a wilful tort." Crane, Cases on Damages(1st ed.) 129 note. Undoubtedly this comment is perfectly proper. Any one
liking the most logical, regular and orderly development of law would cer-
tainly prefer to agree with it. But here, as in many other portions of the
law, the growth is not consistently logical, regular or orderly.
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mond Hill R. Co. v. East Richmond Hill L. Co.,6 as follows:
"As a general rule, the law requires that one who has been in-
jured either in his person or his property by the wrongful act
of another especially where the act is not wilful or intentional or
continued in bad faith, is under a duty to make reasonable effort
to minimize the consequential damages, and if he does not make
such reasonable effort he will be debarred from recovering the ad-
ditional damages which result from such failure."
In support of the proposition that the rule of avoidable con-
sequences does not apply to cases of intentional wrong, the court
cites Den Norske Amerikalinje Actiesselskabet v. Sun Printing
& Publishing Association,7 in which Hiscock, C. J., said:
"But these cases [in which the requirement of avoiding con-
sequences, where they can reasonably be avoided, is adhered to]
do not involve instances of intentional injury to or invasion of
the rights of person or property. Although the act complained of
was unlawful as in breach of contract, or negligent, it was not
performed with malicious or wilful intent to injure, and a dis-
tinction very well may be drawn between the two classes of cases
in respect of any duty which would rest upon the injured party.",,
Section 918 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts reads as
follows:
"(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a person injured by
the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for such
harm as he could have avoided by the use of due care after the
commission of the tort.
"(2) A person is not prevented from recovering damages for
a particular harm resulting from a tort if the tortfeasor intended
such harm or adverted to it and was recklessly disregardful of
it, unless the injured person with knowledge of the danger of
such harm intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own
interests."
It seems that the Restaters intended to project from the field
of contributory negligence into the field of avoidable consequences
the following formulae:
1. "Negligence of defendant + contributory negligence of
plaintiff = no recovery."
5(1919) 226 N. Y. 1, 122 N. E. 463.
7Citing Athens Mfg. Co. v. Rucker, (1887) 80 Ga. 291, 4 S. E. 885;
Satterfield v. Rowan, (1889) 83 Ga. 187, 9 S. E. 677; and Galveston, etc.
Ry. Co. v. Zantzinger, (1898) 92 Tex. 365, 370, 48 S. W. -563, 44 L. R. A.
553, 71 Am. St. Rep. 859. The latter case is not really one of avoidable
consequences, being rather a case sustaining the well-recognized rule that
contributory negligence is not a defense to a wilful tort.
8(1936) 246 App. Div. 301, 305, 285 N. Y. S. 424, 428.
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2. "Recklessness of defendant + contributory negligence of
plaintiff - recovery."
3. "Recklessness of defendant + contributory recklessness of
plaintiff no recovery."
On the question whether this section 918 of the Restatement
is stated in the best possible manner, there would doubtless be
much of disagreement. In fact, it would seem probable that very
few practicing lawyers would like this section as it stands. The
use of the word "advert" seems particularly unfortunate. It ap-
pears likely here that the meaning intended is "to turn one's
attention to ;" but the use of the word in this sense is not very
common, and the word could mean "to refer to." Anyway, does
the common man, the average juror, have any kind of clear con-
ception of what is meant by such a word as "advert?" "Advert"
is one of those vague English words of Latin derivation, which
had, in the Latin, in the earlier centuries of its use, a meaning
that was physical and plain, "to turn to." In classical Latin,
adverto connotes a mental "turning to" a thing. In the English
of today, "advert" is one of those vague, uncommon Latin de-
rivatives, which tend rather to obscure than to clarify. "Advert"
should not be used in any attempt to frame a rule of law that
must be used as the basis of a clear instruction to a jury. A
cloudy instruction to a jury is worthless. In the preface to the
thirteenth edition of his textbook on Torts, the late Sir Frederick
Pollock said that he had learned that a restatement of the law of
torts was being undertaken by the American legal profession and
that only good could come of such an undertaking if it were
kept constantly in mind that the statement of rules of law of
torts could be of value only if stated in such language as could
be understood by a jury when put into the form of instructions.
The word "advert" would always, at best, present so hazy a
concept to the average juror, that the judge would, in every in-
stance, find it necessary to explain the term or to substitute for
it plainer English. If this portion of the Restatement had been
placed before the legal profession in the form of a tentative draft,
as were earlier portions, such a monstrosity might have been
avoided, for practicing lawyers would have advised against it.
Quoting the above section of the Restatement of Torts, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, in a fairly recent case, 9 said:
"This rule applies to all injuries wrongfully inflicted, whether
9(1940) Yazoo & M. R. Co. v. Fields, 195 So. 489, 196 So. 503.
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by means of a tort or the breach of a contract, and deals not with
conduct of a plaintiff contributing to his injury, but with his
failure to avoid the consequences of his injury after it has been
inflicted, to avoid or diminish the damages resulting from his
injury. Injury, strictly speaking, 'means something done against
the right of the party, producing damage, whereas damage is
the harm, detriment or loss sustained by reason of the injury.'"
In overruling a suggestion of error in this case, the court held
that, where railroad section workers set fire to grass between the
main track and a spur track and left the place without completely
extinguishing the fire, which later crossed the spur track and
destroyed the plaintiff's gin house house and plant, if the fire had
already reached the gin premises and was on the gin owner's
private property at the time of plaintiff's gin foreman's asserted
negligence in not intercepting the fire, the owner would be entitled
to recover at least nominal damages, and that in itself was enough
to avoid a peremptory instruction for the railroad, the defendant.
In such a case, in other words, the technical right of action re-
mains, although the doctrine of avoidable consequences may strip
the action of all compensatory damages.
One wonders whether the direct proposition, sometimes made,
that the rule of avoidable consequences does not apply to cases
of wilful wrong has not its genesis in the rule that a wilful
or reckless tortfeasor cannot set up contributory negligence as a
defense. The avoidable consequences rule has sometimes been
treated as if it were a part of the contributory negligence rule.
This is natural, for the reason underlying the two rules is the
same, i.e., that courts have not been willing to give a plaintiff
damages for loss occasioned by his own act or omission.'0
Probably most nuisances, if not amounting to wilful wrongs,
can be said to be maintained in reckless disregard of the rights
of neighboring property owners. Of course, this is not true of all
nuisances; but the fact that it is true of so many of them is
probably a factor in causing courts to treat so large a number
of nuisance cases as not governed by the rule of avoidable con-
sequences.
The rule of avoidable consequences was held not to apply to
the nuisance of smelter smoke and fumes, where plaintiff, a farm-
ing corporation, could have minimized damage only by extra-
ordinary expenditures and effort. The holding that extraordinary
1oSee Mfayne, Damages (10th ed. 1927) 75, 87.
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expenditu res and effort need not be made by the plaintiff is of
course usual in cases involving the issue of avoidable conse-
quences; but, in this smelter case, the acts of defendant seem to
have been flagrant and probably perpetrated in reckless disregard
of the plaintiff's rights. 1
An action was brought for damages resulting from deprecia-
tion in value of plaintiff's home and injury to the health of
plaintiff's wife by reason of the operation of a gas plant very
close to plaintiff's home. The court held that an instruction plac-
ing upon plaintiff a duty of minimizing damage was erroneous,
saying:
"17 Corpus Juris, 777, under the heading 'Injury to Property,'
states the rule to be that the requirement of minimizing damage
is held not to apply in cases of nuisance, or in cases of intentional,
or positive and continuing torts."'12
It was held that the victim of a continuing nuisance was not
required to take active measures, involving considerable expense,
which might or might not be practical, to prevent further injury,
in order to minimize damage. 3
In an action wherein the court refers to "the wrongful acts
of appellant's servants in negligently diverting the waters of
'Greasy Creek,' * * * and causing them to overflow and stand
upon plaintiff's land," and refuses to allow the application of
the rule of avoidable consequences, the following statement is
made:
"He [plaintiff-appellee] was under no duty to relieve ap-
pellant of the consequences of its negligence, and could have done
nothing in the matter of minimizing his damages, that would have
been so effectual as the restoration by appellant of the natural
streams by which his land was drained and its overflow prevented,
before they were dosed or changed by appellant.'. 4
The court indicates that plaintiff might have been required to
incur slight expense, but not great expense. Though this case
seems to be treated by the court as one of nuisance arising through
"American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Riverside Dairy & Stock Farm,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1916) 236 Fed. 510.
"The rule requiring the injured party to protect himself from the
consequences of the wrongful act of another by the exercise of ordinary
effort, care, and expense on his part does not apply in cases of nuisances."
De Young, J., in Johnston v. City of Galva, (1925) 316 Ill. 598, 147 N. E.
453, 38 A. L. R. 1384.
12Champa v." Washington Compressed Gas Co., (1927) 146 Wash. 190,
262 Pac. 228.
13Joerger v. Pacific Gas & E. Co., (1929) 207 Cal. 8, 276 Pac. 1017.
'-- 14Madisonville, etc. R. Co. v. Cates, (1910) 138 Ky. 257, 127 S. W.
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defendant's negligence, if every person may be taken to intend the
almost certain results of his acts, it would seem that it is pos-
sible to say that here the wrong was intentional or at least reck-
less, for the circumstances of the case would tend to prove that
the result was one that the defendant knew to be coming as a
result of his act. Probably, at the very least, recklessness is
involved.
Where defendant wilfully caused damage to plaintiff by ob-
structing a ditch and overflowing plaintiff's land, it was held that
plaintiff was not bound to remove the obstruction from the
ditch or to dig an opening around the obstruction in muddy
weather.",
Where the defendant, a power company, by its wilful act in
placing dams and generators, set back the water of a river, ren-
dering a ford between the lands of riparian owners impassable,
and the defendant maintained a ferryboat at such ford, it was
held that the defendant's conduct in maintaining such boat did
not impose upon the plaintiffs, riparian owners, a duty to oper-
ate a similar boat in order to mitigate damages. 16
In an action for fraud, it was held that it was not the duty of
the defrauded party to attempt to minimize damages by making
a reasonable effort to realize on his investment, which had been
fraudulently induced by the defendant.'
Where an action was brought for the defendant's making it
impossible for the plaintiff to use his pool for cotton-ginning
purposes, by dumping burning cotton into it, it was held that the
plaintiff was under no duty to diminish damage by restoring the
pool. The plaintiff was held to be entitled to damages for the in-
juries to the pool, whether it was restored or not. 8
The defendants wrongfully and forcibly ejected the plaintiff
from land on which he had lived in a tent, and destroyed and
burned his tent. They carried some of his goods to a poor person,
to be used as fuel, and scattered the rest on the ground. It was
held that the plaintiff owed the defendants no duty to gather
such fragments, but was at liberty to leave them and to recover
damages for their loss.' 9 Of course, it must be admitted that this
result might be justified on the ground that, when the goods of
'DWood Mosaic Co. v. Britt, (1912) 150 Ky. 357, 150 S. W. 355.
16Fewell v. Catawba Power Co., (1915) 102 S. C. 452, 86 S. E. 947.17Penfield v. Berhenke, (1915) 94 Kan. 532, 146 Pac. 1187.
2'Ross & Ross v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., (1915) 120 Ark. 264,
179 S. W. 353.
"'Eisele v. Oddie, (D. Nev. 1904) 128 Fed. 941.
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plaintiff had thus been converted, plaintiff could sue for their
full value, without making any attempt to get them back, or
according to the better view, even refusing to accept their return
by the wrongdoer.
In a case of wilful destruction of claimant's forebay, trespass,
and building a wall on the plaintiff's land, the plaintiff was held
to be under no duty to take extraordinary measures to minimize
damages.20
In an action of trespass, where the treaspasser took gravel
from the plaintiff's land and thereby weakened the plaintiff's
irrigation ditch, the plaintiff was held to be under a duty only
to make reasonable expenditures and efforts.2 1
An action was brought for the wrongful refusal of defendant
to supply water to plaintiff for irrigation purposes. In affirming
judgment for plaintiff on a verdict for $2,300, the court said that
the rule of avoidable consequences did not require a plaintiff to do
anything unreasonable. Apparently the plaintiff could have avoided
damages by paying to the defendant $60. Clearly the fault of
the defendant was great. The "duty" of the plaintiff to avoid con-
sequences was relaxed. 22
Whatever formula is used, whether it be that the rule of avoid-
able consequences does not apply to cases of wilful or reckless
wrong, or that plaintiff is not obliged to go to extraordinary
trouble and expense to avoid consequences, which latter formula,
perhaps with a somewhat different force, would be true even in
a negligence case, such cases as the above rather obviously relax
the "duty" to avoid damage as fault increases.
An action was brought for damages for the defendant's in-
ducing a third party to break a contract to furnish the plaintiff
certain machines. The court held that it would have been improper
to give instruction that defendant was not liable for damage
that could have been avoided by the plaintiff's using the defend-
ant's machines, for the reason that the defendant had no right to
shut out plaintiff from every other market and thus to force the
plaintiff to buy machines from the defendant."3 Here the "duty"
of the plaintiff to avoid damage is relaxed. The tort of the de-
fendant is wilful, and his fault is very great.
20People's Gas & E. Co. v. State, (1919) 189 App. Div. 421, 179 N. Y.
S. 520.
2"Bader v. Mills & Baker Co., (1921) 28 Wyo. 191, 201 Pac. 1012.
2-Northern Colorado Irr. Co. v. Pouppirt, (1912) 22 Colo. App. 563,
127 Pac. 125.
"3Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. Exeter Boot & Shoe Co., (C.C.A. 1st
Cir. 1908) 159 Fed. 824.
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In an action brought for fraud in selling an imperfect title
to land, it was held that plaintiff did not have to avoid damage
by buying in the outstanding title piecemeal or by running the
chance of a purchaser's rights which could not be determined
without litigation. The court said:
"Doubtless cases will arise when a duty may rest on one de-
frauded to minimize his loss; but this is not such a case, and we,
of course, must limit our holding to the facts in the case be-
fore us."24
An action was brought for personal injuries. The plaintiff,
a boy, was riding in the defendant's truck, which was driven by
defendant. The plaintiff's presence in the truck had been consented
to by the defendant. While the plaintiff was preparing to alight on
a slippery highway, the defendant accelerated with a jerk, throw-
ing the plaintiff to the pavement and seriously injuring him. On
the question of the "duty" of the plaintiff to mitigate damage
by having a surgical operation, the court said: "Of course, the
plaintiff cannot be compelled to submit to an operation which
involves the least danger to life." 2  When one considers that this
was a case in which there was apparently more than the negligence
of which the court speaks, in fact, perhaps considerable reckless-
ness in the conscious taking of a great chance of throwing the boy
to the highway by acceleration so sudden, one suspects that this
recklessness may have been a factor in causing the court thus
severely to limit the operation of the rule of avoidable conse-
quences in this case, for the rule limiting the "duty" to undergo
a surgical operation is not ordinarily so closely limited as it is
here, when the court says that the plaintiff cannot be compelled
to submit to an operation which involves the least danger to life
in order to mitigate damages. One may well compare the more
fairly typical negligence case of Ward v. Ely-Walker Dry Goods
Co..- which recognizes the "duty" of plaintiff to undergo a head
operation, where the facts seem to make it obvious that such
operation could not possibly have been without the "least danger
to life." The latter case is, however, very clearly a pure and simple
negligence case.
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of
Contracts does not take into account any difference in administer-
ing the avoidable consequences rule against wilful contract-
24Haukland v. Muirhead, (1925) 233 fich. 390, 206 N. W. 549.
2 1Murray v. Cohen, (1926) 4 N. J. 'Misc. 139, 132 At. 221.
;-"(1913) 248 TMo. 348, 154 S. W. 478, 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 550.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
breakers and negligent or accidental contract-breakers, merely
saying:
"Damages are not recoverable for harm that the plaintiff should
have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable effort without
undue risk, expense, or humiliation.
'27
Yet there exist contract cases on avoidable consequences in
which clearly the courts have considered motive in the breach.
Such a case is Beeson Bros. v. Chambers,28 in which sawmill
owners contracted with a hauler of lumber to put a road in good
condition. It was held that the hauler, upon breach by the sawmill
owners, was not under a duty to mitigate damages by repairing
the road. The court gives as a justification the fact that the
defendant sawmill owners were authorized by the road commis-
sioners to make such repairs, and that plaintiff hauler was not so
authorized, but does not say that the plaintiff could not easily have
obtained such authority. Perhaps a more important reason is that
this was plainly a case of wilful and malicious breach of contract.
The court stresses motive.
In spite of the fact that courts generally hold that punitive
damages cannot be assessed for breach of contract, they have
sometimes treated roughly the wilful breaker of a contract, by
stretching legal principles, particularly the principles of the law
of damages. In the comparatively recent case of Groves v. John
Wunder Co., 29 the plaintiff owned a tract of 24 acres of Minne-
apolis suburban real estate, served or easily reached by railroad
tracks, and zoned for heavy industry; but, for lack of develop-
ment of the neighborhood, it seemed that its principal value was in
the deposit of sand and gravel therein contained. The plaintiff had
on the tract a plant for excavating and screening the gravel. The
defendant owned and operated a similar plant on neighboring
land. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract, under which
plaintiff leased to defendant its tract for a term of seven years,
defendant agreeing to remove the sand and gravel and to leave the
property "at a uniform grade, substantially the same as the grade
now existing at the roadway * * * on said premises, and that in
stripping the overburden * * * it will use said overburden for
the purposes of maintaining and establishing said grade." Under
the contract, defendant got plaintiff's screening plant and inci-
27Sec. 336 (1).
28(1930) 155 Wash. 564, 285 Pac. 433.
29(1939) 205 Minn. 163, 286 N. W. 235, 123 A. L. R. 502, annotated
in (1939) 24 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 114, (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 138,
and (1940) 40 Columbia L. Rev. 323.
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dentally got rid of plaintiff as a competitor. Defendant 1aid
plaintiff $105,000. Defendant broke the contract deliberately. "It
removed from the premises only 'the richest and best of the gravel'
and wholly failed, according to the findings, 'to perform and com-
ply with the terms, conditions, and provisions of said lease * * *
with respect to the condition in which the surface of the demised
premises was required to be left.' Defendant surrendered the
premises, not substantially at the grade required by the contract
.nor at any uniform grade.' Instead, the ground was 'broken,
rugged, and uneven.'" If defendant had performed its under-
taking to level off the ground, plaintiff's tract would have been
worth $12,160, for which, plus interest and costs, plaintiff had
judgment. Plaintiff appealed, contending that it should have
judgment in a sum sufficient to pay the cost of placing the ground
in the condition in which defendant had contracted to place it.
It was found that the reasonable cost of leveling the land would
involve the excavation of 288,495 cubic yards of overburden,
transportation of it from the premises, and the depositing of it
elsewhere, which would bring the cost of defendant's performance
to more than $60,000. In reversing the judgment, the supreme
court held that the larger sum should be recovered. If the case
had arisen on facts different in that plaintiff had already, at the
time of bringing action, expended the necessary $60,000 or more
to avoid the damage that might accrue from having the land un-
leveled as a result of the breach of contract by defendant, would
the same court have said that plaintiff could recover for his ex-
penditure, as against a contention on the part of defendant that
such an expenditure constituted an element of avoidable damage?
Probably so, when one considers the attitude of the court here
toward the wilful contract-breaker.
In an action for breach of a charter-party by a freighter, in
not supplying a cargo, it was held that the plaintiff was not under
a duty to get rid of expense by keeping his boat and horses un-
employed and dismissing his employees. Apparently this also was
a case of wilful breach.3
With what appeared to be wilfulness, a buyer broke his con-
tract to purchase timbers. It was held that the seller, to mitigate
damages, need not sell to a person of doubtful credit.31 If there
were sufficient doubt about the credit, probably this would be so
in any case; but it is natural to wonder whether a case of some-
3"Benson v. Atwood, (1858) 13 Md. 20.31T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Phelps, (1911) 138 Ky. 71, 127 S. W. 516.
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what slight doubt as to such person's credit might not be sufficient
to excuse the seller from reselling, if the breach were wilful.
Defendant's agent had agreed to sell plaintiff, a woman, a rail-
road ticket to Lexington and Frankfort, to expire on the 15th; but
he gave her a ticket to Elkatawa, to expire on the 12th. Her trip
was ruined by her being escorted from the train at Elkatawa.
Defendant's conductor, on the return trip, threatened to expel her
from the train, whereupon, to avoid expulsion, she borrowed
money from passengers. The case may properly be viewed as one
presenting a somewhat flagrant, though negligent, breach of
contract. The court, in affirming a judgment for $850, held that
plaintiff was not under a duty to exercise more than ordinary care
to avoid damage.3 2
In a case of apparently wilful breach of contract by a pur-
chaser, Lurton, United States Circuit Judge, referring to the rule
that one must do what he reasonably can to mitigate the loss, said:
"The duty imposed by the equitable rule referred to must be held
within reasonable bounds. It is a rule which has never been re-
garded as requiring one to yield to a wrongful demand that he
may thereby save the wrongdoer from the legal consequences of
his own error.
33
It has often been said in judicial opinions that only slight
expenditure by the plaintiff is required, and that he need not go
to great expense to avoid damage caused by defendant's wrong-
ful act. Where this kind of pronouncement is made in a contract
case, it is ordinarily a case of wilful breach. In Stanley Alanly
Boys' Clothes, Inc. v. Hickey,3" the court said: "The duty to miti-
gate damages to favor one who has so breached his contract with
you does not require an outlay of anything more than slight ex-
pense. No great expense or unusual or burdensome exertion or
effort is required. We think the assumption of a debt to some
third person is an unusual and unreasonable effort. * * * Breaches
of contract should not be encouraged or made easy." The case in
which this pronouncement was made was clearly a case of wilful
breach.
Likewise, the restriction on the rule, to the effect, in terms,
that only reasonable effort need be made to avoid consequences,
32Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sandlin, (1925) 209 Ky. 442, 272 S. W.
912. 33Hirsch v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1909) 169
Fed. 578.34(Tex. Com. App. 1924) 259 S. W. 160.
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appears in what seem to be principally cases of wilful breach of
contract. In Salembicr, Levin & Co. v. North Adams Manufac-
turing Co.,31 a case in which there seem to have been no extenuat-
ing circumstances attending the breach, and very possibly a wilful
breach, the court said: "If the injured party makes reasonable
efforts on behalf of the one in default, he has done all he is re-
quired to do." Furthermore, the court stresses the fact that de-
fendant could have performed in full, if it had taken proper
preparatory steps in season.
The plaintiff, a bondholder, under the terms of the bonds, had
a right to convert the bonds. The defendant, the corporation
issuing the bonds, denied the plaintiff's right to convert. It was
held that plaintiff was not bound to accept principal and interest
due on the bonds in order to mitigate damages for defendant's
refusal to convert.6 Here was an obvious case of wilful and high-
handed breach of contract.
Even if, however, there be a very flagrant breach of contract,
if there be also very great ease in avoiding consequences, it has
often been required that the plaintiff shall have acted with reason-
able diligence to mitigate damages. For instance, where action was
brought by sellers of tobacco against a buyer for refusing to re-
ceive tobacco and pay for it according to contract, and defendant,
the buyer, offered to accept and pay for all of the tobacco except
a little, but the plaintiffs refused, judgment for plaintiffs was
reversed, on the ground that plaintiffs could easily have avoided
nearly all damage by permitting the defendant to have what he
wantedY7
A brought action against B, a carrier, for misdelivery at point
of destination of a carload of lumber. The shipment was to A's
own order, with a specification in the bill of lading to notify C, to
whom the shipment had been sold. The lumber was delivered
directly to C, without A's consent or direction. A did not imme-
diately learn of the delivery, and spent considerable time in fruit-
less negotiation with C. After A learned what had happened, C
having used some of the lumber, A sold the rest to another pur-
chaser, refusing to accept the offer of C to take the lumber and pay
full price. The court held that A's conduct was not such as to
;1,(1919) 178 N. Y. S. 607.
';Brooks & Co. v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co., (N.D. N. Car. 1929)
32 F. (2d) 800.
:
7Byars v. Hammock, (1924) 205 Ky. 684, 266 S. W. 365. See alsoWeed v. Lyons Petroleum Co., (D. Del. 1923) 294 Fed. 725, aff'd Lyons
Petroleum Co. v. Weed, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 300 Fed. 1005.
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justify B in asserting that the shipper had not sought to reduce
its damage by accepting the breach of the original contract of
purchase by the consignee, and that the shipper, A, was not bound
to break its new contract in order to accept the consignee's newer
offer to take the lumber.38
Even where defendant's wrong is wilful, a court is sometimes
ready to apply the avoidable consequences rule in favor of de-
fendant, if the plaintiff has suffered damage that could very easily
have been avoided by the plaintiff. Where there was a wilful
breach of contract to sell treasury stock of a corporation but it
would have been very easy to avoid consequences by purchasing
the same stock in the market, it was held that the plaintiff should
have so acted to mitigate damages and that he could not recover
for the damage that was avoidable.
3 9
The American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, Section
918, endeavors to tie up the entire subject of avoidable conse-
quences in torts in the same strait jacket in which, perhaps properly
enough, is confined, at least in theory, the entire subject of con-
tributory negligence. While it might seem logical to do just what
the Restaters have done, it is submitted that this attempt to state
in rigid and exact form a rule to govern that which is not generally
treated by courts as being rigid and exact, is unfortunate. An
examination of the cases on avoidable consequences will reveal
the fact that only in a very few instances has a court spoken as if
so rigid a principle as that in the Restatement existed at all. The
degree of the blameworthiness of the defendant has clearly and
profoundly affected the disposition of these cases; but the mere
nebula of tendency has not become solidified into the rigid sub-
stance of an exact rule. It is further submitted that to attempt the
statement of such a rule as that in the Restatement will not cause
the actual disposition of these cases to be at all different from
what it has been in the past.
A great many cases are found in which courts have applied
the avoidable consequences rule to instances of negligent torts and
to those of negligent or accidental breaches of contract. Sometimes
the operation of the rule is completely excluded from a case of
wilful or reckless tort or of wilful breach of contract, and the
operation is often closely limited in such cases. Unobtrusively,
quietly, and sometimes in complete silence on the subject, there
38 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Co. v. Bliss-Cook Oak Co., (1915) 118 Ark.
323, 176 S. W. 325.39NVeed v. Lyons Petroleum Co., (D. Del. 1923) 294 Fed. 725.
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seems to be attached to the general rule of non-liability for avoid-
able consequences a kind of corollary to the effect that the rule
must be relaxed to an unstated degree when it is invoked in favor
of defendants guilty of wilful or reckless wrongs. The degree
of defendant's blameworthiness often modifies the operation of
the general rule of avoidable consequences; but this modification,
it is submitted, is nearly always one resulting from tendency
rather than from the application of any rigid rule.
